{"id":3956999,"recorded_at":"2026-11-07T17:55:01.550875Z","observed_at":"2026-11-07T17:55:01.550763Z","subject_kind":"endpoint","subject":"5fb9a9e5-6fc0-4b29-a300-33516158db35","kind":"mcp.tools","method":"probe.mcp/1","body":{"count":5,"tools":[{"description":"Free sample. Before a coding agent runs a shell command, ask whether to allow, review or block it: root deletion, download and run, privilege escalation, secret exfiltration. Pass the human intent when you know it. Not a sandbox: it reads the command, it does not run it.","inputSchema":{"properties":{"command":{"description":"The shell command the agent wants to run.","type":"string"},"intent":{"description":"Optional. What the human asked the agent to do.","type":"string"}},"required":["command"],"type":"object"},"name":"verdict_command_gate"},{"description":"Free sample. Before an agent acts on untrusted content (pay, send, delete, click, reply), give the human goal, the content it read and the action it proposes. Returns allow, review or block: it catches actions that follow orders hidden in the content.","inputSchema":{"properties":{"action":{"description":"The action the agent wants to run (tool call, command, payment).","type":"string"},"content":{"description":"The untrusted content the agent read.","type":"string"},"goal":{"description":"The objective the human gave.","type":"string"}},"required":["goal","content","action"],"type":"object"},"name":"verdict_firewall"},{"description":"Free sample. Before your agent reads untrusted text (web page, email, document, tool output), check it for prompt injection, data exfiltration requests, secrets and toxic content. Returns allow, review or block with scores and reasons. Use it on text you did not write. Do not use it to judge an action: use verdict_firewall.","inputSchema":{"properties":{"text":{"description":"The untrusted text to examine (4000 characters maximum in free samples).","type":"string"}},"required":["text"],"type":"object"},"name":"verdict_guard"},{"description":"Free sample. Before installing an MCP server, skill or tool: is its description poisoned (hidden orders to the agent, excessive permissions, look-alike names)? Returns allow, review or block with reasons.","inputSchema":{"properties":{"description":{"description":"The description text it exposes to the agent.","type":"string"},"name":{"description":"Name of the tool or server.","type":"string"},"permissions":{"description":"Optional permissions requested, for example filesystem:write, network, shell.","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array"},"tools":{"description":"Optional list of { name, description } of the functions it exposes.","items":{"type":"object"},"type":"array"}},"required":["name","description"],"type":"object"},"name":"verdict_mcp_vet"},{"description":"Free sample. Before your agent buys or swaps an ERC-20 token on Base: static reading of its contract. Returns allow, review or block with facts: is it a contract, who controls it, can the owner mint, freeze or block, can the code be replaced, is there real liquidity, does the name imitate a known token. Not a buy-and-sell simulation and not a guarantee.","inputSchema":{"properties":{"address":{"description":"The token contract address on Base (0x followed by 40 hex characters).","type":"string"}},"required":["address"],"type":"object"},"name":"verdict_token_check"}]},"body_sha256":"9ed2e3dfb5322b4cc9e3138d358d65a4a129646d1f72cf7843590acc650b5ae8","prev_id":223250,"leaf":"0x8f770cefe53ac57047040de7b0b00f2dc27de52ef37fd88d73e413de68b79e8f","leaf_text":"{\"body\":\"9ed2e3dfb5322b4cc9e3138d358d65a4a129646d1f72cf7843590acc650b5ae8\",\"id\":3956999,\"kind\":\"mcp.tools\",\"method\":\"probe.mcp/1\",\"observed_us\":1794074101550763,\"prev\":223250,\"subject\":\"5fb9a9e5-6fc0-4b29-a300-33516158db35\",\"subject_kind\":\"endpoint\"}","day":{"day":"2026-11-07","leaves":195826,"root":"0x17da9e85e1b138541355d33543ff34e3503cd3a49d37728fb53643e2a0416a2d","chained":"0xed34bd4af17282643de8cb9591c84d0aa1b39e1e9ae9864941e543f5a15718cb","anchor_chain":"eip155:5042002","anchor_tx":"0xc3f6784179e0ca32236ba89472473e882a81d03fcc5ce27ca58ded2e01e112aa","anchor_block":71280839},"proof":["0x8f76c4ff96e521462713d8177af83352311560b6ed7b404a8db970f623df5ba8","0x810cee96ba8df6c7f3e34168ab0cff27cec748118e2883e41057e1299bb184ed","0xe7690bb67ef7f1bec3ca83e5b6c9c8473aa060a6330ddef3a6941859649e010f","0x2e915ec2dde15ecb99f193e3875ec7fae6b968ef4f4204f4334497e6919aa284","0xf5103073c7bebe98323fa75a55b61f33a3d60f9819b129a565d67c3eef65303d","0xaeb276d5646ccb5c39b4b1ec9df7f130d6fb4421047c1b0c2ebd4e08a7c5e451","0x1619647087c03f3285aa92c16de4e706dc2246b46d8570a2e37b2ac9d2cca2d9","0x311f36adc407f9e3fca524f8f613352981f9084be3b2117c99f48fdb546272be","0x214d4bf820770beb8864d9ccd5de28cd8aa6ed516416a7718bb10c37a95d4364","0x52dfbd6241508249b11635ff6d24e124ccca07279d460d6cd365030b4dde74f7","0x756bc5d2433e38df3ce0d333dd650af2cc9dfb48de4bb81632aaa4dd7bf0fbc7","0x178279a5518a038b0e67dbfdc6763ec229614949ffc29cb265ffac0a0673ed52","0x9682a45d206e1fc61d76ea972f726840f5eda46c7daffbc58a220981508fac26","0x7fdbd47e4134db735f3e6c3439146d858995f8da72a5028572de4b4477efdbf1","0xd41994358bb34b15f062df47abfbb736ac4887eb6ef21ce32a5d581e6ae47e6e","0x39ddab61a3a1eeffcb2f54acf6ff87eaec375674f3e77f00c342826d4e1bf071","0x3b69f6d98c91b21287021db092e52491474f0d08438393ac130d6a3c273bcd4a","0xff23fa8a9de3f957315ef0dfe7e8d8f6b1a51dae05fef7615c59794e019ff05c"]}